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Abstract 
What should be the aim when teaching matters of culture to students in public 
high schools and universities in Africa? One approach, which is parochial, 
would focus exclusively on imparting local culture, leaving students unfamiliar 
with, or perhaps contemptuous of, other cultures around the world. A second, 
cosmopolitan approach would educate students about a wide variety of cultures 
in Africa and beyond it, leaving it up to them which interpretations, values, and 
aesthetics they will adopt. A third way, in between these two, would be to give 
some priority to understanding and enriching local culture, while being open to 
and not remaining ignorant of other cultures. In this article, a work of moral 
philosophy, I argue for this third alternative by rebutting arguments for the other 
two approaches and by showing that it uniquely follows from a plausible 
African ethic informed by indigenous ideals of communion.  
Keywords: African ethics; communalism; cosmopolitanism; culture; curriculum; 
higher education; parochialism 
Introduction 
What should be the aim when teaching matters of culture to students in public schools, 
ranging from at least secondary to tertiary education, particularly in Africa? For many 
traditional African societies (by which I mean those relatively uninfluenced by the East 
or the West), and according to some philosophers inspired by them, the point of 
education in regard to culture should be to enable young adults to help sustain a local 
way of life. In contrast to this parochial approach, an influential view in the West is the 
cosmopolitan one that such students should be informed about a wide variety of cultures, 
with it left up to them which one(s) they will adopt on the basis of their own choices or 
interests.  
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These two views are at the opposite ends of a spectrum. From a parochial perspective, 
only one culture matters for its own sake in the classroom, while, from a cosmopolitan 
one, all cultures merit equal consideration there (at least insofar as they are not unjust). 
In contrast to both perspectives, in this article I articulate and advocate a third 
alternative, at least given an African context. By this middle path, it would be right for 
schools to give priority to understanding and enriching local culture, while also 
informing students of many other cultures. 
I expect this “priority” approach, roughly of making the local first and the global second, 
will be intuitively attractive to many readers. However, I do not rest content with that, 
and provide a moral defence of the approach. Other types of arguments in respect of 
cultural instruction are possible; for instance, one could appeal to the non-moral values 
of authenticity or beauty to determine which culture(s) should be imparted. However, it 
is widely accepted that moral considerations are particularly weighty, such that if 
pursuing some non-moral value incurred serious wrongdoing such as a human rights 
violation, it would usually be reasonable, all things considered, not to do so. Supposing 
that morality is central to (even if not exhaustive of) what one should consider when 
determining how public schools should instruct culture, in this article I advance some 
reasons both to doubt arguments for rivals of the priority approach and to think that it 
follows from an attractive ethic.1  
In particular, I show that teaching the global while emphasising the local is prescribed 
by a moral theory that articulates relational ideas from the sub-Saharan philosophical 
tradition in a way that should be of interest to a global audience, in part because it 
includes both impartial and partial dimensions. This ethic is the principle that actions 
and policies are right if and only if they treat people as having dignity in virtue of their 
capacity to relate communally, where an agent ought to prioritise communal 
relationships of which she is already a part. I spell out what a communal relationship 
amounts to and show that respecting people as capable of it means teaching students in 
a way that supports a local way of life, while taking care to ensure that they are not 
ignorant of the rest of the world. 
In order to make headway, I assume for much of the article that a given society has a 
single culture, loosening this restriction in the conclusion, where I acknowledge the 
reality of multicultural societies in Africa and elsewhere. There are complications in 
multicultural societies that I do not try to address here, saving them for another occasion. 
My aim is to show that the local should receive priority relative to the global, which 
nonetheless also merits a place in cultural instruction, leaving for another occasion the 
distinct issue of how to balance the instruction of different local cultures.  
                                                     
1  My approach to cultural instruction is broadly similar to what Appiah (2006) advances, but my 
defences of this approach differ from his, particularly by virtue of my appeal to a communal ethic.   
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In addressing cultural instruction, I take up just about everything intuitively relevant to 
culture except for moral education.2 I exclude it because morality probably admits of 
norms that are universally applicable and binding, unlike, say, those for making music 
or participating in rituals. In addition, there is already a large literature on moral 
education that deserves its own treatment.3 In the rest of the article I proceed by first 
spelling out more of what I mean by “cultural instruction,” the familiar parochial and 
cosmopolitan approaches to it, the salient arguments for these approaches, and some 
prima facie reasons to doubt these arguments. Then, I articulate the alternate, 
prioritarian approach that I favour, spell out an Afro-communal ethic and show that its 
combination of impartial and partial relationality provides support for my favoured 
view. I conclude by noting some complexities that I will have glossed over in this article, 
especially regarding moral education and multiculturalism, and that merit further 
discussion elsewhere.  
Influential African and Western Approaches to Cultural Instruction 
In this section I sketch the basics of the debate between parochialism, specifically that 
in the African philosophical tradition, and cosmopolitanism, which is characteristic of 
contemporary Western philosophy of education. Beyond setting the stage for an 
approach to cultural instruction that differs from both, I also aim to cast doubt on the 
salient rationales for parochialism and cosmopolitanism.  
In describing cultural instruction I do not provide a rigorous analysis of what culture is, 
which is unnecessary in order to clarify which kinds of teaching I am addressing in this 
article. The concept of culture is well known for being heavily contested (for a taste of 
recent debates, see Birukou et al. 2013; Rathje 2009; Spencer-Oatey 2012). For my 
purposes it will suffice to point out that by “culture” I include things such as languages, 
values, belief systems, social relationships, aesthetics, and knowledge. For example, 
what counts as Chinese culture would include (but hardly be exhausted by) the written 
language of Mandarin, the value of harmony, Confucianism and other non-theist 
worldviews, the norm of saving face, the practice of calligraphy, and the tendency to be 
pragmatic and holist when seeking to understand the world. In contrast, European 
culture includes (amongst other things) written Romance and Germanic languages, the 
value of autonomy, monotheism and especially Christianity, the commonness of a 
nuclear family, the prizing of abstract visual arts, and a theoretical and analytic 
orientation towards the pursuit of knowledge. 
                                                     
2  One might suspect there is some tension in making a moral argument for a certain way to teach 
culture while setting aside issues of moral instruction, but there is not; arguing that it would be 
wrong, say, to keep students ignorant of lifestyles around the world is compatible with setting aside 
discussion of which conception(s) of wrongness students ought to be taught (even if the former 
would naturally have some implications for the latter), so as to focus on, e.g., the arts. 
3  For just a sample of the literature, see Kiss and Euben (2010). 
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So construed, culture in this article excludes large facets of medicine, technology, 
engineering, economics, domestic politics, international relations, chemistry, and 
physics, if only for the sake of focus. There can of course be cultural dimensions to 
these fields, but the suggestion is that there would be something substantial to them that 
would remain if one abstracted from those. In any event, in order to make the discussion 
tractable, I mainly address what should be taught in university departments such as 
music, visual art, architecture, literature, languages, sociology, religion, and philosophy. 
Insofar as culture is indeed relevant to the study of other fields, say, medicine and 
economics, the kinds of suggestions made here in principle apply to them. In addition, 
if a university or high school were to take the advice of this article, it could make sense 
to devote an entire, interdisciplinary course to the local culture, in order to obtain a big 
picture of many of its dimensions and their relationships. 
In traditional African societies, and in philosophical work inspired by them, when it has 
come to teaching young adults about culture, the dominant theme has been the need to 
enable them to sustain and participate in the local way of life. In an article that surveys 
the major aims of education in pre-colonial Africa, a leading scholar of it, Augustus 
Adeyinka, and a colleague remark (Adeyinka and Ndwapi 2002, 18–19),4 
Children developed a sense of obligation towards the community and grew to appreciate 
its history, language, customs and values. This is perhaps one of the greatest attributes 
of indigenous education as opposed to Western education which has been rightly 
accused of alienating young Africans from their cultural heritage. … Most traditional 
communities in Africa perceived education as a vehicle for maintaining or preserving 
the cultural heritage and status quo. This partly accounts for why traditional teachers 
discouraged their pupils from probing into the unknown and imposed heavy sanctions 
on those who tried to do so. 
Notice how the descriptive and prescriptive are interwoven in the quotation. On the one 
hand, the authors are recounting how traditional African societies have typically 
educated so as to sustain their respective cultures, while, on the other hand, the authors 
express support for such an approach.  
One finds something similar in an additional paper by Adeyinka, co-authored with 
another colleague. Here, they favourably quote the first Nigerian professor of education, 
Aliu Babatunde Fafunwa, on the “cardinal goals of African traditional education,” the 
sixth and seventh ones being the following (Adeyemi and Adeyinka 2002, 228; see also 
229):  
(6) To develop a sense of belonging and to participate actively in family and community 
affairs; (7) To understand, appreciate and promote the cultural heritage of the 
                                                     
4  For a similar analysis, but largely in the context of moral education in traditional African societies, 
see Pearce (1990) and Ikuenobe (2006, 135–255). 
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community at large. The identified principles listed above have far reaching implications 
for the formal education of today. 
Again, the suggestion is that contemporary education in Africa has something to learn 
from the traditional form of it when it comes to how to teach culture.5  
What would make sense of this narrow sort of approach to cultural instruction, one that 
does not consider it essential to teach young adults about cultures from other parts of 
the world? An armchair anthropology suggests that many indigenous sub-Saharan 
peoples formed small-scale societies that did not routinely come into contact with 
cultures radically different from their own (e.g., Busia 1962, 80; cf. Appiah 2006, xii–
xiii). If there were little prospect of interacting with those from alien cultures, let alone 
ever leaving your society for one, then there would be little incentive to learn about 
them.  
However, as is well known, in the 21st century globalisation is in full swing. Rural 
villagers often access the internet and see their livelihoods depend on decisions made in 
other societies.  
It could also be that some underlying moral values have been taken to prescribe 
parochialism when it comes to culture. For example, the principle of “family first,” 
common in traditional African societies (on which see, e.g., Appiah 1998), might have 
been interpreted to mean that only the folkways of one’s people matter. For another 
example, consider the idea that one’s foremost goal in life should be to become a real 
person, i.e., to exhibit virtue, which one can do, according to one influential 
interpretation of the sub-Saharan tradition, insofar as one accepts “the rituals of 
incorporation and the overarching necessity of learning the social rules by which the 
community lives” (Menkiti 1984, 173).  
However, another salient part of African ethics (e.g., Deng 2004; Gyekye 2010), and 
indeed any philosophically plausible moral perspective, includes an impartial strain. 
Characteristically, human beings have dignity (or at least a full moral standing) that 
merits consideration by everyone else, an egalitarian standpoint that can provide 
leverage for criticising, say, gendered customs in one’s society. Including such an 
impartial dimension in one’s ethical worldview would enable one to make good sense 
of, e.g., the practice common amongst indigenous African villages of welcoming 
visitors with food and a place to sleep (Gathogo 2008; Mandela 1996). The idea that all 
human persons have dignity would underwrite a practice of hospitality, while also aptly 
forbidding the treatment of innocent strangers merely as a means to the ends of one’s 
community. Hence, even if family should come first and one must learn the local rules, 
it does not follow that the rest of the world’s peoples and their ways of life do not matter. 
                                                     
5  For broadly similar views, see many of the contributions to Seepe (1998) and to Higgs et al. (2000).   
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In short, even if partial morality prescribes parochialism, that is not the only sort of 
morality. 
Finally, these days a notable argument for focusing exclusively on indigenous African 
ways of life when educating young adults is an appeal to redress for what is widely 
known amongst philosophers as “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2015; Grasswick 2018, 
sec. 4.1), whereby one can be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower, or more broadly, 
thinker. Since European colonial education neglected and even denigrated traditional 
sub-Saharan  ways of interpreting the world, some maintain that, to make things right, 
at least African schools in the post-colonial era should focus on recovering them, with 
Western cultures sometimes being deemed akin to a virus that must be eradicated 
(Murove and Mazibuko 2008, 104–5) or to a ghost that must be exorcised (Murove and 
Mazibuko 2008, 108; see also Lebakeng, Phalane, and Dalindjebo 2006, 77).  
However, rectificatory or compensatory justice, which is what the political community 
owes those insofar as they have been wronged, is not the only sort of justice. It should 
be advanced in ways that are consistent with distributive justice, i.e., what the political 
community owes those insofar as they have not been wronged, or at least in ways that 
do not impinge greatly on this value. Distributive justice could prescribe familiarity with 
non-African cultures, perhaps as a potential way to improve African people’s quality of 
life, which I indeed argue below.  
Not all African philosophers favour a parochial approach to education. In fact, Kwasi 
Wiredu, one of the most influential African philosophers of the post-independence era, 
objects to the sort of “education”––he thinks “indoctrination” or “authoritarianism” are 
better words––he finds prominent in traditional Africa, namely, one that accords “a low 
priority, if any at all, to the discussion of alternatives or even to the rational justification 
of the one given alternative” (1980, 3). He prefers an approach in which students would 
be enabled “to perceive, in relation to any given issue, as many as possible of the 
relevant alternatives” (Wiredu 1980, 3). That approach is at the heart of cosmopolitan 
cultural instruction, which has been a salient, if not dominant, theme in contemporary 
Western philosophy of education.  
Broadly speaking, a cosmopolitan orientation towards education in respect of culture6 
includes an “intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness to divergent cultural 
experiences” as well as “respect and enjoyment of cultural differences with a sense of 
global belonging” (McCarty 2011, 7). A cosmopolitan education would teach students 
a wide array of languages, values, belief systems, social norms, and aesthetics. Instead 
of solely “educating the children in the family and clan tradition” (in the words of the 
former Kenyan president, Jomo Kenyatta, quoted in Adeyemi and Adeyinka [2002, 
                                                     
6  As is well known, there are a variety of cosmopolitanisms, including moral and political beyond the 
cultural, on which see Kleingeld and Brown (2013).   
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229]), education would impart “the ability to think as a citizen of the whole world, not 
just some local region or group” (Nussbaum 2002, 289). In addition, the attitude towards 
the world’s cultures would be a substantially neutral one, in the sense of avoiding 
favouritism towards the culture of the students’ own society. Indeed, by a cosmopolitan 
approach, students “would be encouraged to question their narrow attachments” (Waks 
2009, 589), as opposed to being expected and prompted to uphold them.  
Martha Nussbaum (2002; 2010) has been a particularly influential advocate of a 
cosmopolitan approach to education, although she has hardly been the only one (see 
also, e.g., Hansen 2010; Papastephanou 2005; Waldron 2003). Of course, just as not all 
African philosophers favour parochialism, Wiredu being a clear exception, so not all 
Western philosophers favour cosmopolitanism.7 Even so, cosmopolitanism is 
prominent in contemporary Western philosophy of education in ways it is not in most 
other philosophies around the world, such as Islamic or Confucian varieties.  
Although cosmopolitanism is routinely associated with some strains of early Greek 
thought, it is the natural companion of the egalitarian and individualist ethical systems 
that grew out of the European Enlightenment (Appiah 2006; Kleingeld and Brown 2013, 
sec. 1.2). If what confers the same moral standing on us is our ability to govern ourselves 
with our rational faculties, as per Kantianism, or to satisfy our informed preferences, à 
la utilitarianism, then it would likely be immoral for educators to restrict students to any 
one conception of the good life. What would matter instead would be the individual 
student’s choice, made in the light of an awareness of as many options as possible, or 
her satisfaction, potentially achieved from any source.  
However, just as “family first” is implausibly interpreted to require a strict partiality 
such that out-groups do not matter morally, so impartiality implausibly exhausts the 
domain of the moral. You really should save the life of your mother before that of a 
stranger, if you had to choose between them, such that you should feel more guilt for 
not having rescued her than for not having rescued him. It is difficult for impartial moral 
theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism to entail and plausibly explain why. In 
the next section I articulate an ethic that is attractive for including both partial and 
impartial facets and that grounds reasons for students to become aware of cultures other 
than their own, while nonetheless prioritising it.  
A Prioritarian Approach to Cultural Instruction and Its Communal 
Foundation 
In this section I spell out a “middle path” between parochialism and cosmopolitanism, 
at least of the sorts analysed in the previous section. I argue that the balance it tries to 
strike between being aware of cultures from around the world while showing greater 
                                                     
7  For some exceptions see the discussion of Nussbaum’s critics in Waldron (2003) and Waks (2009). 
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concern for one’s own culture is plausibly grounded on a relational, and specifically 
communal, morality that has both impartial and partial dimensions. I do not maintain 
that the only theoretical way to defend the priority approach to cultural instruction is by 
appeal to the ethic I invoke below; however, insofar as the ethic is appealing, the priority 
approach gains some support for following from it.  
The Priority Approach  
With this approach to cultural instruction, the focus should be on the local while not 
ignoring the global; to speak of “prioritising” one’s own culture is meant to suggest that 
other cultures are not entirely neglected and do receive some attention. To use an 
analogy, it would be neither a monarchy, where one person has all the power, nor a 
democracy, where power is equally shared; instead all would have some power, but 
some would have a greater share than others. A school’s emphasis should be on 
understanding, enriching, and participating in the prominent culture in which the school 
is set, while also ensuring students learn about ones elsewhere in the world that might 
be quite different from their own.  
From this perspective, contra cosmopolitanism, it would inappropriate merely to 
construct “world citizens,” with no particular ability to support their culture or interest 
in doing so. Instead, the aim should be to produce citizens who identify with their culture 
and are in a position to contribute to it, more than with other cultures. However, contra 
parochialism, the aim should also be to produce citizens who understand and are open 
to learning from cultures other than their own, so that it would be wrong for teachers to 
discourage pupils from probing into the unknown and considering changes to the status 
quo.  
Let us look at an example of what this approach would entail for the curriculum. When 
it comes to literature, a school in an African country should focus on novels that were 
written by those from it and that are about it, supplemented by works written by those 
from other African cultures. In addition, given that a large majority of African societies 
have featured oral “texts” for several centuries, students should listen to stories, 
proverbs, and poems recounted by elders, either in person or in digital form. Although 
a majority of the literature curriculum in an African school should be African, it should 
not neglect texts from, say, the Indian, Latin American, and Euro-American traditions. 
And where styles, techniques, or insights from non-African sources would be revealing 
when adapted to an African context, students-cum-writers should borrow them. Such an 
approach would differ from the parochial one of excluding the foreign on the one hand, 
and from the cosmopolitan one of according equal weight amongst sources, on the other. 
A similar approach would apply to disciplines such as music and philosophy.  
When it comes to the attitude of the teacher, she would not impose sanctions on students 
for being interested in non-African texts, and instead should readily facilitate access to 
them. However, she might especially enable and encourage students to engage with the 
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local culture. For example, she might point out that it would be revealing to develop it 
in a certain way, suggesting that pupils should continue their studies with an eye to 
making a contribution someday. Or she might organise a written or oral competition 
whereby students would demonstrate their knowledge of texts composed by their 
people. Or she might organise field trips so that students listen to readings by local 
authors and poets and ask questions of them.  
A Communal Ethic 
Parochialists will object that students might choose to forsake the local upon becoming 
aware of the global, while cosmopolitans will object, to use Wiredu’s terms, that there 
is no “rational justification of the one given alternative,” i.e., that the emphasis on the 
local is not defended and perhaps is not defensible in the face of a global array of 
options. To respond to these concerns, as well as provide more general support to the 
priority approach, I now advance a communal ethic that I have articulated and applied 
to a variety of topics for more than a decade (key texts bearing on education include 
Metz 2009; 2012; 2015; 2018). I do not indicate here how I arrived at the ethic, setting 
aside the myriad African sources that have informed it, and instead focus on motivating 
it to a global audience and showing how it grounds the priority approach to cultural 
instruction. 
The ethic has both impartial and partial facets. As noted above, it has been common for 
African peoples, or at least the philosophers inspired by them, to think in terms of 
“family first,” on the one hand, while they have also tended to ascribe dignity to human 
beings, on the other. To enable these two ideas to cohere, I have suggested that, instead 
of thinking of human beings as having dignity in virtue of their having a life force that 
has come from God, which has been the usual idea in the African tradition (e.g., Deng 
2004, 500–1; Gyekye 1997, 63–64; Iroegbu 2005; Wiredu 1996, 157–71), we should 
consider them to have dignity in virtue of their relational nature.  
Specifically, according to my favoured ethic, we should treat individuals with respect 
insofar as they are capable of relating communally (or harmoniously). Communion 
(harmony) consists of two logically distinct ways of relating. First, it includes a relation 
of identity in which one both enjoys a sense of togetherness with others, say, thinking 
of oneself as part of a “we” and taking pride in what others have achieved, and 
participates with them on a cooperative basis. Second, it includes a relation of solidarity 
in which one helps others, in terms of both making people better off and making them 
better people, which one does out of sympathy with them and for their sake. The 
combination of identity and solidarity is full communion, and is characteristic of how 
members of an intuitively desirable family, workplace, or neighbourhood interrelate. 
By my account, a person has dignity insofar as she is capable of being both a subject 
and object of communal relationship. That is, she has a superlative non-instrumental 
value that demands respect insofar as she can exhibit identity and solidarity with others 
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and others can exhibit identity and solidarity with her. It follows that a very large 
majority of human beings have dignity and so count from the moral point of view, 
regardless of where they are in the world or whether they are related to the agent. This 
conception of human dignity plausibly explains why, if you had to choose between 
striking a mouse or a human person with your car, you should hit the mouse; the human 
is worth more than the mouse and is so because it is more capable of being party to a 
communal, or roughly loving, relationship. A being, such as a mouse, that cannot be a 
subject of communion but could be an object of it with us has a partial moral status, but 
not dignity, by this account; so, if the choice were between running over a plant and a 
mouse, you should target the plant.  
Simply having the capacity to relate communally confers moral importance on people, 
entitling them all to some protection and concern. However, treating people with respect 
in virtue of their capacity to commune will mean taking into account the ways they have 
actualised this capacity (just as, for Kantian ethicists, one respects people’s capacity for 
autonomy by reacting in certain ways to  the autonomous choices they have made). For 
example, where an agent has communed with other parties in the past, that provides 
some (pro tanto) moral reason to continue to do so with them, relative to enemies or 
strangers. Family members, co-workers, and neighbours are the sorts of persons who 
merit extra cooperation and help from a given agent, because of the relationship she has 
shared with them. This social interpretation of “family first” is meant to supplant the 
traditional African way of grounding partial obligations, viz., on blood ties (on which 
see Appiah 1998).  
Unlike the partial moral theories of egoism and Western communitarianism, according 
to which the norms of one’s society ground moral obligations (e.g., Walzer 1983), this 
communal ethic has a strong impartial dimension, ascribing dignity to a very large 
majority of human beings. In this way, the ethic captures the strong intuition that an 
agent has duties in respect of those who cannot help or harm her and who are beyond 
her in-group; it is a person’s capacity to relate that gives everyone a reason to take her 
into moral account. However, unlike the impartial moral theories of consequentialism 
and Kantianism, this ethic also has a principled partial dimension. Since it entails that 
there is extra reason to continue to commune with those who have already been in 
communion with one, and since it does not make obligations to aid particular parties 
contingent on the long-term consequences or the fact of having made a voluntary 
commitment to aid them (by, e.g., having made a promise), this ethic (best) captures the 
strong intuition that one must save the life of one’s mother before a stranger. I take it 
that the ethic is attractive in these respects.  
Defending the Priority Approach with the Communal Ethic 
Consider, now, what this communal ethic means for the way a school ought to instruct 
a young adult regarding culture. Against the cosmopolitan approach, the communal 
ethic entails that such students have weightier obligations to identify with and exhibit 
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solidarity towards the culture of the society in which they have been embedded. At least 
insofar as young adults have enjoyed a sense of togetherness with a certain society and 
participated in it and this society has helped them by having socialised them and 
supported their studies, they have an obligation to commune with it that is to some extent 
stronger than they have in respect of some other society. And, so, when it comes to 
cultural instruction, students have extra reason to think of the local culture as theirs and 
to take pride in it, to participate in it as opposed to remaining aloof from it, to help enrich 
it, and to do these things “because this is who we are” and not merely for self-interested 
reasons.   
As noted above, cosmopolitans are likely to object that there is nothing special about 
one’s own culture, that its interpretations, styles, and the like demand justification in the 
face of so many competing alternatives on the globe. That might be relevant for a 
Kantian ethic that would prize “training intended to enable people to make deliberate 
rational choices” (Wiredu 1980, 3). However, it is not so relevant to a communal ethic, 
characteristic of African philosophy but of prima facie appeal to a broad audience, 
according to which “immorality is the word or deed which undermines fellowship” 
(Kasenene 1998, 21). The plausible reason to give greater attention to local culture than 
to other cultures throughout the world is not that the former is better or somehow more 
justified, but rather that it is one’s own. Putting it on an even footing with other cultures 
would arguably be to undermine one’s fellowship with other members of one’s society.  
Turning to the parochial approach, there are several reasons for thinking that it is 
incompatible with the communal ethic, despite the latter’s relational orientation. First 
off, when it comes to solidarity, a school must enable its students, living in a globalised 
world, to interact with other cultures that are likely to affect them. However, it would 
be a mistake to think that the non-local cultures that should be taught are only those 
likely to influence students’ lives in virtue of extant socio-economic dynamics. Even if 
students would be unlikely to visit a certain foreign culture, and even if people from that 
foreign culture were unlikely to make decisions that would shape the lives of these 
students, they might still have something to learn from it. It is reasonable to think that 
any long-standing tradition has some insight into the human condition, which means 
that it would be harmful to restrict students’ knowledge to only one; they would be 
prevented from improving the quality of life of themselves and others. For instance, I 
presume that literacy has on the whole been a welcome addition to African cultures that 
did not have it before (setting aside the unjust, colonial means by which it was often 
imposed). 
In addition to solidarity, there is some reason in terms of identity to teach more than just 
the local to young adults. Although young adults did not voluntarily choose to grow up 
in the society where their parents have reared them, this fact does not in itself mean that 
they have been oppressively subjected to its culture. Their day-to-day interactions could 
be communal, roughly based on trustful coordination, as opposed to coercion, 
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deception, or exploitation. Even so, it is true that the communion would be all the more 
intense if the decision to participate in, and otherwise uphold, the local culture were an 
informed one. A society that restricted its people’s knowledge of other types of cultures 
would not honour their capacity to commune, where people coming together and staying 
together of their own accord is the intuitively most valuable instance of that.   
Yet another communal reason to teach young adults about cultures other than their own 
is to enable them to share their own culture with people who are members of quite 
different ones. According to the communal ethic everyone has dignity that demands 
respect, and so, given that every long-standing culture has some insight into the human 
condition, it follows that there is some reason for, say, African peoples to go out of their 
way to share their cultures with the rest of the world.8 Although there is a particularly 
strong reason for Africans to commune with other Africans, where they can commune 
with non-Africans at little cost to themselves, they should, which, in turn, means 
offering some of their wisdom, aesthetics, and the like to the rest of the globe. However, 
in order to be able to convey one’s own culture to others, one needs to understand them 
and what they value when it comes to knowledge, art, etc.  
Parochialists will tend to object that, upon being informed of other ways of life, there is 
no guarantee that students will choose to abide by the local one. That is true; the odds 
of the local garnering support are likely to go down upon students becoming aware of 
other, global options. However, the relevant way to support culture, by the communal 
ethic, is cooperatively, not by foisting it on people. Part of what is attractive about a 
friendship or romantic relationship is people having made the decision to stay in it based 
on an awareness of what the other party is like and knowing that there are other 
possibilities. That is real commitment or communion, with similar remarks applying to 
the relationship between students and others in society who are members of a culture. 
Although students have an obligation to support the culture of their society, society in 
turn has an obligation not to force them to do so. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have abstracted from certain complexities in order to make it easy to 
spell out and defend a prioritarian approach to cultural instruction that differs from 
parochialism and cosmopolitanism. I have been writing as though there exists only one 
culture for a certain society, but of course many societies in the 21st century are 
multicultural in Africa and elsewhere. In addition, I have been implicitly assuming a 
given culture lacks morally troubling elements, for instance is free of patriarchal force, 
but many cultures are in fact oppressive (or, in my terms, are discordant rather than fully 
                                                     
8  For more on the importance of African peoples taking this “outward” approach, and not merely an 
“inward” one, see Metz (forthcoming). 
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communal). Furthermore, I remind the reader that I have set aside one major element of 
culture, namely, moral education.  
A more comprehensive account of cultural instruction would take multiculturalism, 
oppression, and moral education into account. Where there are multiple cultures in a 
society, should schools devote resources to them in proportion to the demographics? 
Presumably historical injustice done to one group’s culture would warrant extra 
attention for a time, but are there additional reasons, besides compensatory justice, to 
deviate from demographic proportionality? Where a local culture is oppressive, does 
that mean a public university ought not to teach that part of it, or should teach it but 
criticise it, or should teach it but remain neutral in respect of it, leaving it up to students 
to decide for themselves without “bias”? When it comes to morality, might there be 
strong reason to err in favour of parochialism as opposed to the priority approach 
advanced in this article for the putative reasons that moral norms have a particularly 
weighty influence on how the rest of society is organised or that one has strong 
epistemic reason to trust the moral testimony of elders in one’s society (cf. Ikuenobe 
2006)? Or, in contrast, since moral norms are universally applicable, is there strong 
reason to err in favour of cosmopolitanism as opposed to the priority approach, 
consulting a very wide array of moral perspectives in search of common ground? My 
hope is that the communal ethic and priority approach to cultural instruction advanced 
in this article are of enough interest to merit extension to these difficult matters in future 
work.9 
References 
Adeyemi, M. B., and A. A. Adeyinka. 2002. “Some Key Issues in African Traditional 
Education.” McGill Journal of Education 37 (2): 223–40. 
 
Adeyinka, A. A., and G. Ndwapi. 2002. “Education and Morality in Africa.” Pastoral Care in 
Education 20 (2): 17–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0122.00225. 
 
Appiah, K. A. 1998. “Ethical Systems, African.” In Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
edited by E. Craig. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-Z008-1. 
 
Appiah, K. A. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton and Company.  
 
Birukou, A., E. Blanzieri, P. Giorgini, and F. Giunchiglia. 2013. “A Formal Definition of 
Culture.” In Models for Intercultural Collaboration and Negotiation, vol. 6, edited by K. 
Sycara, M. Gelfand, and A. Abbe, 1–26. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
94-007-5574-1_1. 
                                                     
9  I thank three anonymous referees for Education as Change for their comments on an earlier draft of 
this article.  
 14 
 
Busia, K. A. 1962. The Challenge of Africa. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger.  
 
Deng, F. M. 2004. “Human Rights in the African Context.” In A Companion to African 
Philosophy, edited by K. Wiredu, 499–508. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470997154.ch42. 
 
Fricker, M. 2015. “Epistemic Injustice.” In Oxford Bibliographies Online, edited by D. 
Pritchard. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0274. 
 
Gathogo, J. 2008. “African Philosophy as Expressed in the Concepts of Hospitality and 
Ubuntu.” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 130 (1): 39–53. 
 
Grasswick, H. 2018. “Feminist Social Epistemology.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by E. Zalta. Accessed May 28, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-
social-epistemology/. 
 
Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African 
Experience. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gyekye, K. 2010. “African Ethics.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. 
Zalta. Accessed May 28, 2019. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/. 
 
Hansen, D. T. 2010. “Chasing Butterflies without a Net: Interpreting Cosmopolitanism.” 
Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (2): 151–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-009-
9166-y. 
 
Higgs, P., N. C. G. Vakalisa, T. V. Mda, and N. T. Assie-Lumumba, eds. 2000. African Voices 
in Education. Cape Town: Juta. 
 
Ikuenobe, P. 2006. Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African 
Traditions. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Iroegbu, P. 2005. “Right to Life and the Means to Life: Human Dignity.” In Kpim of Morality 
Ethics, edited by P. Iroegbu and A. Echekwube, 446–49. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational 
Books. 
 
Kasenene, P. 1998. Religious Ethics in Africa. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 
 
Kiss, E., and J. P. Euben, eds. 2010. Debating Moral Education: Rethinking the Role of the 
Modern University. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822391593-001. 
 
Kleingeld, P., and E. Brown. 2013. “Cosmopolitanism.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by E. Zalta. Accessed May 28, 2019. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/.  
 
 15 
Lebakeng, J. T., M. M. Phalane, and N. Dalindjebo. 2006. “Epistemicide, Institutional Cultures 
and the Imperative for the Africanisation of Universities in South Africa.” Alternation 13 
(1): 70–87. 
 
Mandela, N. 1996. “Ubuntu Told by Nelson Mandela.” Excerpt from an interview with Tim 
Modise. YouTube video, 1:37. Accessed May 28, 2019. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HED4h00xPPA. 
 
McCarty, L. P. 2011. “Cosmopolitan Education.” Colleagues 6 (1): 6–7. 
 
Menkiti, I. 1984. “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In African 
Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd ed., edited by R. Wright, 171–81. Lanham: University 
Press of America. 
 
Metz, T. 2009. “The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory.” 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (2): 179–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9752.2009.00689.x. 
 
Metz, T. 2012. “Communitarian Ethics and Work-Based Education: Some African 
Perspectives.” In Learning, Work and Practice: New Understandings, edited by P. Gibbs, 
191–206. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4759-3_14. 
 
Metz, T. 2015. “How the West Was One: The Western as Individualist, the African as 
Communitarian.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (11): 1175–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2014.991502. 
 
Metz, T. 2018. “An African Theory of the Point of Higher Education: Communion as an 
Alternative to Autonomy, Truth, and Citizenship.” In Contemporary Philosophical 
Proposals for the University, edited by A. Stoller and E. Kramer, 161–86. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72128-6_9. 
 
Metz, T. forthcoming. “What Africa Can Bring to the World.” In General History of Africa, 
Volume 9: Global Africa, edited by T. Chenntouf, ch. 22. Geneva: UNESCO. 
 
Murove, M. F., and F. Mazibuko. 2008. “Academic Freedom Discourse in Post-Colonial 
Africa: A Quest for Transformation and Appropriation of Relevant Knowledge in Higher 
Education.” Africa Insight 38 (2): 101–14. https://doi.org/10.4314/ai.v38i2.22551. 
 
Nussbaum, M. 2002. “Education for Citizenship in an Era of Global Connection.” Studies in 
Philosophy and Education 21 (4–5): 289–303. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019837105053. 
 
Nussbaum, M. 2010. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Papastephanou, M. 2005. “Globalisation, Globalism and Cosmopolitanism as an Educational 
Ideal.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (4): 533–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
5812.2005.00139.x. 
 16 
 
Pearce, C. 1990. “Tsika, Hunhu and the Moral Education of Primary School Children.” 
Zambezia 17 (2): 145–60. 
 
Rathje, S. 2009. “The Definition of Culture: An Application-Oriented Overhaul.” Interculture 
Journal 8 (8): 35–58. 
 
Seepe, S., ed. 1998. Black Perspective(s) on Tertiary Institutional Transformation. Florida 
Hills: Vivlia Publishers and the University of Venda. 
 
Spencer-Oatey, H. 2012. “What Is Culture? A Compilation of Quotations.” GlobalPAD Core 
Concepts. Accessed May 28, 2019. 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad/openhouse/interculturalskills/global_pad_-
_what_is_culture.pdf. 
 
Waks, L. J. 2009. “Reason and Culture in Cosmopolitan Education.” Educational Theory 59 
(5): 589–604. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2009.00340.x. 
 
Waldron, J. 2003. “Teaching Cosmopolitan Right.” In Citizenship and Education in Liberal-
Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities, edited 
by K. McDonough and W. Feinberg, 23–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253668.003.0002. 
 
Walzer, M. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Wiredu, K. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press.  
 
 
